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Abstract. Real life C programs are often written using C dialects which,
for the ISO C standard, have undefined behaviours. In particular, ac-
cording to the ISO C standard, reading an uninitialised variable has an
undefined behaviour and low-level pointer operations are implementa-
tion defined. We propose a formal semantics which gives a well-defined
meaning to those behaviours for the C dialect of the CompCert compiler.
Our semantics builds upon a novel memory model leveraging a notion of
symbolic values. Symbolic values are used by the semantics to delay the
evaluation of operations and are normalised lazily to genuine values when
needed. We show that the most precise normalisation is computable and
that a slightly relaxed normalisation can be efficiently implemented using
an SMT solver. The semantics is executable and our experiments show
that the enhancements of our semantics are mandatory to give a mean-
ing to low-levels idioms such as those found in the allocation functions
of a C standard library.
1 Introduction
Semantics of programming languages give a formal basis for reasoning about
the behaviours of programs. In particular, the correctness guarantee of C com-
pilers [14] and verification frameworks [4] is stated with respect to the program
semantics. However, the C programming language is specified in such a way that
certain operations are either undefined, unspecified or implementation-defined.
Typically, reading uninitialised memory is an undefined behaviour; the order
of evaluation of function arguments is unspecified; the size of the int type is
implementation-defined. A C program is strictly conforming if it does not trig-
ger any undefined, unspecified or implementation-defined behaviour.
This leads to an unsettling question: what is the guarantee provided by a
compiler when the program is not strictly conforming, i.e. when its semantics is
undefined? The short answer is none. The C standard [10] explains that anything
can happen with undefined behaviours: the compiler may fail to compile, but it
could – and usually does – produce an executable code. The behaviour of the
executable depends on compiler flags, especially optimisation levels. The exe-
cutable code may behave as expected by the programmer, but it can also ignore
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the statements that lead to undefined behaviours, or even crash at runtime. For
instance, for the sake of optimisation, the compiler may choose to remove pieces
of code that result in an undefined behaviour [19]. In summary, the advantage of
undefined behaviours is that they can be exploited by C compilers to optimise
the generated code; the downside is that C programs with undefined behaviours
may have unexpected results.
In practice, undefined behaviours have been responsible for serious flaws
in major open source software [19] – optimisations triggered by undefined be-
haviours have introduced vulnerabilities in the target code. Moreover, some low-
level idioms cannot be expressed without resorting to unspecified behaviours of
the C semantics. A compelling example is the memory allocation primitives of
the C standard library which are written using the C syntax but do not have a
strictly conforming semantics. One reason for this is that the low-level bit ma-
nipulation of pointers that is necessary for efficient and robust implementation
of memory allocation is implementation defined.
To alleviate the problem, a common approach consists in setting compiler
flags to disable optimisations known to exploit undefined behaviours [19, Sec-
tion 3.1]. In a sense, flag tweaking is a fragile way to get the desired program
semantics. Wang, Zeldovich et al. [20] propose a more principled compiler ap-
proach where they identify and report code whose optimisation depends on un-
defined behaviours. In this work, we advocate for a semantics-based approach
and propose an executable extension of a C semantics ruling out unspecified be-
haviours originating from low-level pointer arithmetic and undefined behaviours
due to access to uninitialised data.
The C standard describes only an informal semantics, but several realistic
C formal semantics have been defined [17,3,7,12]. They describe precisely the
defined behaviours of C programs, as well as some undefined behaviours. Yet,
none of them accommodates for all low-level pointer manipulations; uninitialised
data are only dealt with in a very limited fashion by the semantics of Ellison
and Ros¸u [7, 6.2.2].
One formal semantics is the C semantics used by the CompCert formally
verified C compiler [14]. CompCert is equipped with a machine-checked cor-
rectness proof establishing that the generated assembly code behaves exactly
as prescribed by the semantics of the C source, eliminating all possibilities of
compiler-introduced bugs and generating unprecedented confidence in this com-
piler. Yet, as for any compiler, the guarantee offered by CompCert only holds for
programs with a defined behaviour. In general, the CompCert compiler provides
a stronger guarantee than an ISO C compiler because its source language Com-
pCert C is more defined than the ISO C99 language. Our goal is to extend the
semantics expressiveness of CompCert C further by ruling out more undefined
or unspecified behaviours.
The contributions of this work can be phrased as follows:
– We present the first formal semantics for CompCert C able to give a meaning
to low-level idioms (bit-level pointer arithmetic and access to uninitialised
data) without resorting to a concrete representation of the memory.
– The semantics operates over a novel memory model where symbolic values
represent delayed computations and are normalised lazily to concrete values.
– We demonstrate that the most precise normalisation is decidable and explain
how to devise an efficient implementation using an SMT solver.
– The semantics is executable and the software development is available at
http://www.irisa.fr/celtique/ext/csem/.
– We show in our experiments that our extensions are mandatory to give a
defined meaning to low-level idioms found in existing C code.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces rele-
vant examples of programs having undefined or unspecified behaviours. Section 3
defines our extension of CompCert’s semantics with symbolic values. Section 4
specifies our normalisation of symbolic values. Section 5 deals with the imple-
mentation of the normalisation using SMT solvers over the theory of bitvectors.
Section 6 describes the experimental evaluation of our implementation. Related
work is discussed in section 7, followed by concluding remarks.
2 Motivating Examples
An example of unspecified behaviour is the order of evaluation of the arguments
of a function call. The relative size of numeric types is defined but the precise
number of bits is implementation defined. An undefined behaviour is for instance
the access of an array outside its bounds. Unsafe programming languages like C
have by nature undefined behaviours and there is no way to give a meaningful
semantics to an out-of-bound array access.1 Yet, certain undefined behaviours
of C were introduced on purpose to ease either the portability of the language
across platforms or the development of efficient compilers. As illustrated below,
our novel memory model gives a formal semantics to low-level idioms such as
access to uninitialised memory or low-level pointer arithmetic.
2.1 Access to Uninitialised Variables
The C standard states that any read access to uninitialised memory triggers
undefined behaviours [10, section 6.7.8, §10]: “If an object that has automatic
storage duration is not initialised explicitly, its value is indeterminate.” Here,
“indeterminate” means that the behaviour is undefined. To illustrate a benefit
of our semantics, consider the code snippet of Fig. 1, representative of an existing
C pattern (see Section 6.3).
The program declares a status variable and sets its least significant bit us-
ing the set function. It then tests whether the least significant bit is set using
the isset function. According to the C standard, this program has undefined
behaviour because the set function reads the value of the status variable before
it is ever written.
1Typed languages detect illegal accesses and typically throw an exception.
However, we argue that this program should have a well-defined semantics
and should always return the value 1. The argument is that whatever the initial
value of the variable status, the least significant bit of status is known to be 1
after the call set(status,0). Moreover, the value of the other bits is irrelevant
for the return value of the call isset(status,0) which returns 1 if and only if
the least significant bit of the variable status is 1. More formally, the program
should return the value of the expression (status|(1≪0))&(1≪0) != 0 which
evaluates to 1 whatever the value of status. Our semantics constructs symbolic
values and normalises them to a genuine value when the evaluation yields a
unique possible value.
2.2 Low-level Pointer Arithmetic
In ISO C, the bit width and the alignment of pointers are implementation de-
fined. We consider here that pointers are encoded with 4 bytes and that the
malloc function returns pointers that are 16-byte aligned (i.e. the 4 least sig-
nificant bits are zeros). The C standard also states that arithmetic operations
on pointers are limited to certain comparisons, the addition (or subtraction) of
an integer offset to a pointer and the subtraction of two pointers pointing to
the same object. In order to perform arbitrary operations over a pointer, it is
possible to cast it to an unsigned integer of type uintptr_t for which the ISO C
standard provides the following specification [10, Section 7.18.1.4].
[The type uintptr_t ] designates an unsigned integer type with the prop-
erty that any valid pointer to void can be converted to this type, then
converted back to pointer to void, and the result will compare equal to
the original pointer.
Note that this specification is very weak and does not ensure anything if a
pointer, cast to uintptr_t , is modified before being cast back. Here, uintptr_t
is implemented by a 4 bytes unsigned integer, and a cast between pointers and
uintptr_t preserves the binary representation of both pointers and integers (i.e.
it is essentially a no-op).
With these assumptions in mind, consider the expected behaviour of the code
snippet of Fig. 2. The pointer p is a 16-byte aligned pointer to a heap-allocated
integer obtained by malloc. Therefore, it has 4 trailing spare bits. The pointer q
is obtained from the pointer p by filling the 4 trailing bits (hence the bitwise and
with 0xF) with a hash of the pointer p. Note that this pattern is used in practice
as a hardening technique to enforce pointer integrity [13]. Then, the evaluation
int set(int p, int flag) { return p | (1 ≪ flag); }
int isset(int p, int flag) { return (p & (1 ≪ flag)) != 0; }
int main() { int status = set(status,0); return isset(status,0); }
Fig. 1. Undefined behaviour: reading the uninitialised variable status
char hash(void∗ ptr);
int main(){
int ∗ p = (int ∗) malloc(sizeof(int));
∗p = 0;
int ∗ q = (int ∗) ((uintptr_t) p | (hash(p) & 0xF));
int ∗ r = (int ∗) (((uintptr_t) q >> 4) << 4);
return ∗r; }
Fig. 2. Unspecified behaviour: low-level pointer arithmetic
of r clears out the 4 trailing bits of q using logical shifts. We argue that r is equal
to p and that the program has a well-defined semantics and returns ∗p (that is
0). Our semantics computes the expected behaviour of this program without
resorting to a concrete representation of pointers as machine integers.
2.3 Summary of Differences with the ISO C Standard
The ISO C standard leaves certain behaviours implementation defined. Among
these, our semantics is parametrised by the size of the pointers and the alignment
constraint of malloc. Our semantics also stipulates that pointer and uintptr_t
types have the same size and that casts between these types preserve the binary
representation of the objects. The ISO C standard states that reading unini-
tialised memory is undefined behaviour. Our semantics is more flexible and sim-
ulates the read of an arbitrary value. Operationally, our semantics propagates a
symbolic undefined value through the execution. These extensions are sufficient
to give a well-defined (and intuitive) semantics to the previous examples.
3 A C Semantics with Symbolic Values
Our semantics is able to model low-level idioms, in particular bit-level manipula-
tion of pointers, while retaining abstraction properties of the current block-based
memory model of CompCert. Our approach consists in computing symbolic val-
ues lazily delaying evaluation until values are really needed. A symbolic value
sv evaluates to a value v if for every possible concrete memory M , sv evaluates
to the same value v.
CompCert defines the semantics of a dozen of intermediate languages ranging
from CompCert C to assembly. All the languages share the same memory model.
The compiler transforms programs from one language to another and proves the
correctness of the transformations with respect to that memory model. The
two highest-level languages are CompCert C (source language) and Clight, a
simpler version of CompCert C with side-effect free expressions. For the sake
of presentation, we introduce our new memory model on the Clight semantics.
However, our implementation leverages the existing CompCert C interpreter
enhanced with our new memory model.
In this section, we first describe our memory model with symbolic values.
Then, we show how to enhance the Clight semantics [3] with symbolic values.
Memory locations: l ::= (b, i) (block, integer offset)
Values: v ::= int(i) | float(f)
| ptr(l) | undef
Memory chunks: κ ::= Mint8signed 8-bit integers
| Mint8unsigned
| Mint16signed 16-bit integers
| Mint16unsigned
| Mint32 32-bit integers or pointers
| Mfloat32 32-bit floats
Operations over memory states:
alloc(M, lo, hi) = (M ′, b) Allocate a fresh block with bounds [lo, hi[.
free(M, b) = M ′ Free (invalidate) the block b
load(κ,M, b, i) = ⌊v⌋
Read consecutive bytes (as determined by κ) at
block b, offset i of memory state M . If successful,
return the contents of these bytes as value v.
store(κ,M, b, i, v) = ⌊M ′⌋
Store the value v as one or several consecutive
bytes (as determined by κ) at offset i of block b.
If successful, return an updated memory stateM ′.
bound(M, b) Return the bounds [lo, hi[ of block b.
Fig. 3. CompCert’s memory model
3.1 The CompCert Memory Model
The semantics of operations involving pointers relies on a memory model defining
how values are represented. The most concrete memory model is an array of
bytes, where pointers and integers are indistinguishable. It can give a precise
semantics, but reasoning on programs at such a low level is cumbersome (e.g.
reasoning on forbidden memory accesses to detect buffer overflows). CompCert
is using a more abstract block-based model [15] where memory is divided into
disjoint blocks, each block corresponding to an allocated variable. A memory is
a collection of blocks, each block being an array of concrete bytes. Intuitively, a
block represents a C variable or an invocation of malloc.
Values stored in memory are defined in Fig. 3. They are the disjoint union
of 32-bit integers (written as int(i)), 32-bit floating-point numbers (written as
float(f)), locations (written as ptr(b,i)), and the special value undef repre-
senting the content of uninitialised memory. Locations ptr(b,i) are composed of
a block identifier b (i.e. an abstract address) and an integer byte offset i within
this block. Pointer arithmetic modifies the offset part of a location, keeping its
block identifier part unchanged. Memory chunks appear in memory operations
load and store, to describe concisely the size, type and signedness of the value
being stored. These functions return option types: we write ∅ for failure and ⌊x⌋
for a successful return of a value x.
The memory is modelled as a map associating to each location an 8-bit ele-
mentary memory value of type memval. A memval value is a byte-sized quantity
that describes the current content of a memory cell. It can be either Undef to
model uninitialised memory; Byte(b) to model a concrete byte b; or Pointer(b, i, n)
to represent the n-th byte (n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) of the location ptr(b, i).
3.2 A New Memory Model with Symbolic Values
Our memory model is built on top of CompCert’s, where we replace the values
with symbolic values, defined as follows.
sv ::= v
| opτ
1
sv unary arithmetic operation
| sv τop2
τ sv binary arithmetic operation
| svτ ? svτ : svτ conditional expression
| (τ)svτ type cast (to a C type τ)
Symbolic values are annotated by C types that are needed to disambiguate over-
loaded C operators. Symbolic values are side-effect free and therefore their evalu-
ation is independent of the memory content. To account for alignment properties
we associate with each block of the memory a mask that the concrete address
of the block needs to satisfy. Formally, the concrete address a of a block with
mask msk must be such that a&msk = a. The allocation primitive is modified
accordingly, and we add a function that returns the mask of a given block. The
primitives load and store now operate over symbolic values instead of values.
alloc(M, lo, hi ,msk) = (M ′, b)
mask(M, b) = msk
load(κ,M, b, i) = ⌊sv⌋
store(κ,M, b, i, sv) = ⌊M ′⌋
We also adapt the memval type to accommodate for symbolic values. To that
purpose, we replace the Pointer constructor by a generalised Symbolic(sv ,n)
constructor which represents the n-th byte of a symbolic value sv .
To perform these memory primitives, we define a key operation extr(sv,i),
which extracts the ith byte of a symbolic value. The reverse operation is the
concatenation of a symbolic value sv1 with a symbolic value sv2 representing 8
bits. Assuming that the symbolic value represents a 32-bit value, these operations
can be defined as
extr(sv,i) = (sv ≫(8∗i)) & 0xFF
concat(sv1,sv2) = sv1 ≪8 + sv2
3.3 Parametrised Semantics of Clight Values
Expressions cannot be kept symbolic forever. Our semantics is equipped with
a partial normalisation function normalise(M, τ, sv) which converts a symbolic
Expressions in l-value position:
G,E ⊢ a,M ⇒ sv normalise(M , type(a), sv) = ⌊ptr(ℓ)⌋
G,E ⊢ *a,M ⇐ ℓ
(1)
Expressions in r-value position:
G,E ⊢ a1,M ⇒ sv1 type(a1 ) = τ
G,E ⊢ op
1
a1,M ⇒ op
τ
1
sv1
(2)
G,E ⊢ a1,M ⇒ sv1 G,E ⊢ a2 ,M1 ⇒ sv2 type(a1 ) = τ1 type(a2 ) = τ2
G,E ⊢ a1 op2 a2,M ⇒ sv1
τ1op
2
τ2 sv2
(3)
G,E ⊢ a1,M ⇒ sv1 type(a1 ) = τ1
G,E ⊢ a2,M ⇒ sv2 type(a2 ) = τ2 G,E ⊢ a3 ,M ⇒ sv3 type(a3 ) = τ3
G,E ⊢ a1 ? a2 : a3,M ⇒ sv
τ1
1
? sv
τ2
2
: sv
τ3
3
(4)
G,E ⊢ a,M ⇒ sv1 type(a) = τ1
G,E ⊢ (τ)a,M ⇒ (τ)svτ1
1
(5)
Fig. 4. Semantics of Clight with symbolic values (excerpt)
value sv to a concrete value of type τ , depending on masks and bounds of blocks
of memory M . The modified Clight semantics of expressions is given in Fig. 4.
It is defined by judgements, parametrised by a global environment G, a local
environment E and an initial memory state M . The evaluation of an expression
in l-value (resp. r-value) position results in a location (resp. symbolic value). In
the judgements, a, a1, a2, a3 range over syntactic expressions and sv, sv1, sv2,
sv3 range over symbolic values.
G,E ⊢ a,M ⇐ ℓ (evaluation of an expression in l-value position)
G,E ⊢ a,M ⇒ sv (evaluation of an expression in r-value position)
Compared to the existing Clight semantics [3], expressions are not completely
evaluated but mapped to symbolic values. Moreover, the rules explicitly intro-
duce calls to a normalisation function (see Section 4). These calls are inserted
when a genuine value is required, i.e. when reading from or writing to memory,
when evaluating the condition of a loop or if-then-else statement, or when
exiting the program.
For instance, to evaluate ∗a, rule (1) recursively evaluates the expression a
to get the symbolic value sv . To get a genuine location l, rule (1) explicitly nor-
malises sv to get l. Now, l can be used to perform a store memory operation.
Rule (2) specifies the evaluation of unary expression op1 a1: it recursively eval-
uates the expression a1 to get the symbolic value sv1 . Instead of evaluating the
operator op1, the semantics delays the evaluation and constructs the symbolic
value opτ
1
sv1 where τ is the type of the expression a1. Similarly, the evalua-
tion of binary expressions (rule (3)), conditional expressions (rule (4)) and cast
expressions (rule (5)) recursively evaluate their arguments and construct a sym-
bolic value. Note that for the original Clight semantics, two rules are needed
to give a semantics to conditional expressions [3, Fig.6, rules (12) and (13)] de-
pending on whether the condition holds or not. With symbolic values, we delay
the evaluation and therefore have a single rule.
4 A Sound and Complete Normalisation
Our semantics with symbolic values aims at giving a defined meaning to low-level
idioms that are out-of-reach of the current Clight. To do so, we need to instantiate
the semantics with an aggressive normalisation function. The existing Clight
semantics can be obtained by a suitable normalisation function. This semantics
is trustworthy because it has been carefully designed, thoroughly reviewed and
intensively tested. However, for more aggressive normalisation (which is what
we aim at), this validation methodology does not scale and therefore provides a
limited trustworthiness.
In this section, we give a formal specification of the normalise function. We
define the notions of soundness and completeness of a normalisation function
with respect to a concrete memory model. We will later show (Section 5) how
to get efficient executable implementations from this specification.
4.1 Soundness of the Normalisation of Symbolic Values
Our semantics is parametrised by the normalisation function normalise. In this
part, we describe the soundness conditions that this normalisation should fulfil.
Symbolic values denote low-level values of types either Tint or Tfloat. The
mapping between high-level C types and low-level types is performed by the
function ctyp defined as follows: ctyp(τ) = Tfloat if τ = Tfloat, and
ctyp(τ) = Tint otherwise. Notice that all the pointer types are mapped to the
type Tint. Indeed, at low-level, addresses are not distinguishable from genuine
integers. To map locations (b, i) to integers, the low-level evaluation is equipped
with a mapping A from block identifiers to concrete addresses, which assigns an
address to each memory block and therefore fixes a memory layout. In general,
the low-level evaluation of a symbolic value is not a single value but a set because
the value undef represents an arbitrary low-level value. Definition 1 formalises
the low-level evaluation of symbolic values.
Definition 1 (Low-level evaluation). Let A be an allocation function map-
ping block identifiers to concrete addresses. The low-level evaluation J·Kτ
A
of a
symbolic value e of type τ is inductively defined by the following rules.
int(n) ∈ Jint(n)KTint
A
float(f) ∈ Jfloat(f)KTfloat
A
ctyp(τ) = Tint
int(A(b) + i) ∈ Jptr(b, i)Kτ
A
ctyp(τ) = Tfloat
float(n) ∈ JundefKτ
A
ctyp(τ) = Tint
int(n) ∈ JundefKτ
A
v1 ∈ Jsv1 K
τ1
A
eval unop(op1 , v1 , ctyp(τ1 )) = ⌊v⌋ type(v) = ctyp(τ)
v ∈ Jopτ1
1
sv1 K
τ
A
v1 ∈ Jsv1 K
τ1
A
v2 ∈ Jsv2 K
τ2
A
type(v) = ctyp(τ)
eval binop(op2, v1, ctyp(τ1), v2, ctyp(τ2)) = ⌊v⌋
v ∈ Jsv1
τ1op2
τ2 sv2 K
τ
A
v1 ∈ Jsv1 K
τ1
A
v2 ∈ Jsv2 K
τ
A
is true(v1 , ctyp(τ1 ))
v2 ∈ Jsv
τ1
1
? svτ2 : sv
τ
3 K
τ
A
v1 ∈ Jsv1 K
τ1
A
v3 ∈ Jsv3 K
τ
A
is false(v1 , ctyp(τ1 ))
v3 ∈ Jsv
τ1
1
? svτ2 : sv
τ
3 K
τ
A
v1 ∈ Jsv1 K
τ1
A
cast(v1 , ctyp(τ)) = ⌊v⌋
v ∈ J(τ)svτ1
1
Kτ
A
By construction, the denotation of a symbolic value of type τ is a set of
values of type ctyp(τ). Symbolic values that are not well-typed have an empty
low-level evaluation. As a side-remark, notice that the types of symbolic values
cannot be uniquely inferred (undef can have an arbitrary type), and are therefore
explicitly given. Moreover, the low-level evaluation of a symbolic value is reusing
the existing high-level operators eval unop and eval binop with the difference
that types are low-level types.
The normalisation of a symbolic value s should return a defined value v
(v 6= undef) such that s evaluates to v for all possible concrete valid memory
layouts. Definition 2 specifies valid memory layouts.
Definition 2 (Valid memory layout). An allocation A from blocks to con-
crete addresses is a valid memory layout for memory M (written A ⊢M) iff:
1. addresses from distinct blocks do not overlap,
2. the address of a block satisfies its mask, i.e. ∀b, A(b) & mask(M, b) = A(b)
3. addresses are not equal to zero.
With the previous definitions we are ready to state what it means for a normal-
isation to be sound.
Definition 3 (Sound normalisation). A normalisation function is sound iff
for any symbolic value sv, it returns a value v (normalise(M, τ, sv) = ⌊v⌋) such
that v is not undef ; v has type τ and v has the same evaluation as sv for any
valid allocation layout i.e. ∀A ⊢M.JsvKτ
A
= JvKτ
A
.
Note that because v differs from undef, JvKτ
A
is necessarily a singleton. Yet,
certain symbolic values containing undef can nonetheless be normalised, for
instance, normalise(M,Tint,undef & 0x0)= ⌊0⌋.
4.2 Reconstructing the Original Clight Semantics
The more precise the normalisation, the more defined the semantics. There is a
hierarchy of normalisations of different precision. We therefore aim at identifying
a normalisation which is not only precise but also tractable. The least precise
normalisation, which always returns ∅, is sound but useless: it fails to provide a
semantics to any expression. The original Clight semantics can be modelled by
a normalisation function which recursively evaluates symbolic values.
type(v) = τ
normalise(M, τ, v) = ⌊v⌋
normalise(M, τ1, e1) = ⌊v1⌋ eval unop(op1, v1, τ1) = ⌊v⌋ type(v) = τ
normalise(M, τ, opτ1
1
e1) = ⌊v⌋
normalise(M, τ1, e1) = ⌊v1⌋ normalise(M, τ2, e2) = ⌊v2⌋
eval binop(op2, v1, τ1, v2, τ2) = ⌊v⌋ type(v) = τ
normalise(M, τ, e1
τ1op2
τ2 e2) = ⌊v⌋
As explained in the introduction, this normalisation is unable to give a se-
mantics to low-level pointer operations (e.g. ptr(b,i) & 0x0) or expressions with
undefined sub-terms (e.g. undef & 0x0). The original Clight semantics could be
enriched to cope with these simple expressions. However, dealing with arbitrarily
complex expressions using ad hoc simplifications would not be manageable.
4.3 Completeness of the Normalisation of Symbolic Values
Whenever possible, the most precise normalisation should always return some
value. Yet there are rare cases where distinct values are sound normalisations.
This is illustrated by Example 1.
Example 1. Consider the normalisation of the symbolic value ptr(b, 0)+231−1
for a pointer type τ in a memory M made of an unaligned block b with bounds
[0, 231 − 1[ and a 2-byte aligned block b′ with bounds [0, 231[. Because the max-
imum capacity of the memory is 232 − 1 bytes (0 is not a valid address), the
memory is full. Moreover, the alignment constraint of b′ prevents it from being
allocated at address 1. It follows that the only valid memory layout of M is
A = [b 7→ 1; b′ 7→ 231].
As we have Jptr(b, 0) + 231 − 1Kτ
A
= Jptr(b, 231 − 1)Kτ
A
= Jptr(b′, 0)Kτ
A
=
{int(231)}, both ptr(b, 231 − 1) and ptr(b′, 0) are sound normalisations.
In this example, the normalisation ptr(b′, 0) is more valuable because it repre-
sents a valid address (i.e. within the bounds of the allocated block). Definition 4
formalises what it means for a normalisation to be complete by stipulating an
ordering ≺M on values such that ptr(b
′, 0) ≺M ptr(b, 2
31 − 1).
Definition 4 (Complete normalisation). A normalisation function norm is
complete if for all sound normalisations norm′, we have:
norm(M, τ, e) 4M norm
′(M, τ, e)
where 4M is the reflexive closure of the ordering ≺M inductively defined below
and < is an arbitrary total order over locations.
⌊v⌋ ≺M ∅ (6)
i ∈ bound(M, b) i′ /∈ bound(M, b′)
⌊ptr(b, i)⌋ ≺M ⌊ptr(b
′, i′)⌋
(7)
i ∈ bound(M, b) i′ ∈ bound(M, b′) (b, i) < (b′, i′)
⌊ptr(b, i)⌋ ≺M ⌊ptr(b
′, i′)⌋
(8)
i /∈ bound(M, b) i′ /∈ bound(M, b′) (b, i) < (b′, i′)
⌊ptr(b, i)⌋ ≺M ⌊ptr(b
′, i′)⌋
(9)
Rule (6) ensures that a complete normalisation is maximally defined and as
much as possible does not return ∅. Rules (7), (8) and (9) ensure that a complete
normalisation should, as much as possible, return a valid address.
There are memories M for which there is no valid memory layout A. The
simple case is when the size of the allocated memory exceeds 232−1 bytes. In
general, reasoning about the size of the allocated memory is not enough because
the memory can be fragmented due to alignment constraints. In such cases,
Definition 4 is not sufficient to ensure that there is a unique sound and complete
normalisation function. The reason is that when there is no valid memory layout,
any value v is a correct normalisation. Moreover, as the order ≺M is not total,
Definition 4 does not rule out these spurious cases. The good news is that all
sound and complete normalisations compute the same result as soon as there
exists a valid memory layout. Our normalisation algorithm (see Section 5) checks
the existence of a valid memory layout and fails to normalise when there is none.
5 Evaluating Symbolic Values using an SMT solver
We have adapted the CompCert C semantics and its executable interpreter to
work with symbolic values. As already demonstrated for the Clight semantics,
the addition of symbolic values is not very intrusive and reuses most of the
semantics infrastructure of the existing interpreter.
The difficulty lies in the implementation of the normalisation function. Given
a memoryM , there are finitely many valid memory layouts A. It is thus decidable
to compute a sound and complete normalisation and the naive algorithm consists
in enumerating over the valid memory layouts and checking that the symbolic
values always evaluate to the same values. Yet, this is not tractable. As shown
below, the normalisation can be recast as a decision problem over the logic
of bitvectors. However, implementing (and proving) in Coq an efficient decision
procedure for this logic would require a substantial engineering effort. Therefore,
our current implementation leverages an external Satisfiability Modulo Theory
(SMT) solver, Z3 [6].
5.1 An Executable Semantics of Symbolic Values
We have adapted the CompCert C interpreter to work with symbolic values.
The modification requires to change the type of values to the type of symbolic
values and to replace the existing memory model by our implementation accom-
modating for symbolic values. As it is illustrated for Clight, the evaluation of
C operators now builds symbolic values and calls to the normalise function are
placed at certain points, as discussed below.
Our memory model stores (resp. reads) symbolic values to (resp. from) mem-
ory but the address needs to be a location (b,i). Therefore, we apply the nor-
malisation function before calling the store and load primitives of the memory
model. The normalisation is also called to compute the target of conditional
jumps (e.g. for, while or if statements). A last normalisation is applied before
ending the program because the program status needs to be a genuine integer. If
the normalisation succeeds and returns some value, then the execution continues
normally. Otherwise, the semantics gets stuck and the interpreter returns that it
encountered an undefined behaviour. We detail in Section 6 some representative
programs of our benchmarks.
5.2 Normalisation as a Satisfiability Problem
The normalisation function is axiomatised and implemented by an external
(trusted) call to the SMT solver Z3 [6]. As stated earlier, the problem of com-
puting the most precise normalisation is decidable. Yet, a naive approach does
not provide a tractable algorithm. A better solution consists in encoding the
normalisation problem as an SMT problem over the logic of bitvectors and un-
interpreted function symbols. A bitvector of size n is the logic counterpart of a
machine integer with n bits. This logic is therefore a perfect match for reasoning
about machine integers.
First, we axiomatise the memory and define a logical function size mapping
each block to its size and a logical function mask mapping each block to the mask
to be verified by the concrete address. Next, we axiomatise the valid memory
layout relation by directly translating Definition 2 in first-order logic.
Example 2. Consider a memory M restricted to two blocks b1 and b2, with b1
of bounds [0, 4[ aligned on word boundaries (i.e. the 4 trailing bits are zeros)
and b2 of bounds [0, 8[ with no alignment constraint. The axiomatisation of M
is given by the following formulae.
Block sizes: size(b) =


4 if b = b1
8 if b = b2
0 otherwise
Block masks: mask(b) =


0xFFFC if b = b1
0xFFFF if b = b2
0xFFFF otherwise
No overlap: ∀b, b′, o, o′.
∧


b 6= b′
o < size(b)
o′ < size(b′)
⇒ A(b) + o 6= A(b′) + o′
Addresses are not 0: ∀b, o.o < size(b)⇒ A(b) + o 6= 0
Alignment : ∀b, A(b)&mask(b) = A(b)
We process the symbolic value e to be normalised into a logical symbolic value e∗
and replace occurrences of undef by distinct fresh logical variables thus modelling
that undef may take any value.
Normalising into an integer. To normalise into an integer, we generate the SMT
query: e∗ = i, where i is a fresh logical variable. Suppose the formula is satisfiable
for a value v for logical variable i. This means that there exists a valid memory
layout such that e is evaluated as the value v. However, this value v is only
a sound normalisation if it is the evaluation for every possible valid memory
layout. To ensure this, we generate the second SMT query: e∗ = i∧ i 6= v. If this
is unsatisfiable, then we will return v as the normalisation of e.
Normalising into a pointer. Getting the normalisation of a pointer value is more
complicated by the fact that there are several ways of decomposing an integer
into a location made of a base and an offset. Yet, as we are only interested in
valid addresses (i.e. with an offset inside the bounds of the block), there is only
a single choice. Therefore, we generate the following SMT query:
e∗ = A(b) + o ∧ o < size(b).
Given a model (b′, o′) for location (b, o), we have to ensure that the evaluation
of the expression is independent from the memory layout. Since blocks do not
overlap, there is only one block such that the pointer is valid, so we just need to
check that b′ is the only possible block that makes a valid pointer, i.e. that the
following formula is unsatisfiable:
e∗ = A(b) + o ∧ o < size(b) ∧ b 6= b′
Example 3. Consider again the memoryM of Example 2 and the symbolic value
e = ptr(b1, 1)− ptr(b2, 2)+ ptr(b2, 4)+ undef&0x0. We process e into a logical
expression e∗ by replacing undef by the fresh variable x1:
e∗ = A(b1) + 1−A(b2)− 2 +A(b2) + 4 + x1&0x0
Notice that the two occurrences of A(b2) cancel out each other, and that we have
∀x, x&0x0 = 0. As a result, we can simplify this expression e∗ into A(b1) + 3.
Normalising into an integer. We need to solve the following SMT query, with
i the unkown: A(b1) + 3 = i. We then get a first solution (e.g. v = 19, with
A(b1) = 16). However, this is not the only possibility because we get a second
solution with A(b1) = 32 for example, which yields v = 35. This expression has
therefore no normalisation as an integer.
Normalising into a pointer. Now, the SMT query we need to solve is:
A(b1) + 3 = A(b) + o ∧ o < size(b)
A solution is b′ = b1 and o
′ = 3, and we can see that this is the only solu-
tion to this equation. Therefore the expression e is normalised into the location
ptr(b1, 3).
5.3 Relaxation and Optimisation of the SMT Encoding
The previous encoding of the memory depends on the number of allocated blocks.
Thus, as the memory gets bigger, the normalisation would get slower. In practice,
we observe that the size of the memory has a dramatic (negative) impact on SMT
solvers. To tackle the problem, we propose a relaxation of the SMT query that
is independent of the number of allocated blocks and only depends on the size
of the symbolic value to be normalised.
A key observation is that a symbolic value can only be normalised if the
corresponding SMT query has a unique solution. As a result, it is always sound
to relax the SMT query and generate a weaker one (i.e. with potentially more
solutions) provided the initial formula is satisfiable. Indeed, if there are more
solutions, the normalisation will fail – this is always sound.
In our relaxation, we do not fully axiomatise the memory but only specify
the bounds and masks of the memory blocks B that appear syntactically in the
symbolic value to be normalised. When normalising a symbolic pointer, we also
state explicitly in the SMT query that the normalisation, if it exists, should be
a location (b, i) such that b ∈ B.
This relaxation will only miss a normalisation if the memory is almost full
and blocks b ∈ B cannot be allocated at certain addresses because of bound or
alignment constraints of other blocks b′ /∈ B. This is illustrated by Example 4.
Example 4. Consider a memory with 3 unaligned blocks b1, b2 and b3 of size 1
and a last block b4 of size 2
32− 4 that is 4-byte-aligned, i.e. the last two bits are
zeros. Because of alignment and size constraints, the block b4 can only be allo-
cated at address 4 while other blocks can be allocated at the remaining addresses
(i.e. 1, 2 and 3). As a result, the symbolic value ptr(b1,0)+ptr(b2,0)+ptr(b3,0)
evaluates to 6 which corresponds to the valid location (b4, 2).
The normalisation of Example 4 requires a full axiomatisation of the memory and
cannot be obtained using our relaxation. In practice, we have never encountered
such a pathological case.
6 Experimental Evaluation
As stated earlier, we have adapted the CompCert C interpreter so that we could
test our semantics on real programs. This required only minor changes to get it
to work with symbolic values. However, we put slightly more effort in designing
stubs in the interpreter to model system calls such as mmap that are used e.g.
in the source code of the malloc implementation we used. This system call is
mapped to the alloc primitive of our memory model. Other system calls such
as open, read or write are resolved using the OCaml equivalent functions.
We have tested our C semantics with symbolic values on the CompCert
benchmarks. Their size ranges between a few hundreds and a few thousands lines
of code. We checked the absence of regression: when the CompCert interpreter
returns a defined value, our interpreter enhanced with symbolic values returns
the exactly same value.
We have also run our interpreter over Doug Lea’s memory allocator [13]
and on parts of the NaCl cryptographic library [2], which are challenging pro-
grams because they perform low-level pointer arithmetic; their size is about a
few thousands lines of code. For this experiment, we model the system call mmap
by a call to the alloc primitive of our memory model with a mask specifying the
alignment of a page. Our interpreter succeeds in giving a semantics to memory
management functions, such as malloc, memalign or free, built on top of mmap.
As there is no other formal C semantics able to deal with low-level pointer arith-
metic, we checked that the result of our interpreter was matching the output of
gcc. Programs reading uninitialised variables have undefined semantics and gcc
could exploit this to perform arbitrary computations. Yet, the output of gcc and
our interpreter agree on examples similar to Fig. 1. In the following, we detail
some interesting patterns found in the benchmarks.
6.1 Pointer Arithmetic Using Alignment and Bitwise Operations
The malloc function sometimes needs to check a pointer’s distance to an align-
ment boundary. This is equivalent to getting the last bits of the pointer. For
instance, this is done with the C expression p & 15, which gets the 4 last bits of
pointer p. For our experiments, pointers are allocated by mmap and are therefore
known to be aligned on more than 16 bytes boundaries. For a pointer p=ptr(b,3),
our SMT encoding models that the last 4 bits of b are zeros and the code eval-
uates to 3&15 (i.e. 3). In general, with the previous alignment constraints, we
have that the symbolic value ptr(b,o) & 15 returns the offset o of the pointer.
A similar example is the function memalign(al,nb), where al must be a power
of two (i.e. al = 2n). The function dynamically allocates a nb-byte region, and
ensures that the address returned has the n last bits to zero. When called with
al = 32, the function computes checks such as p&31 == 0 to check that the 5
last bits are zeros. The left-hand side of the comparison is evaluated in the same
manner as the example above, and the comparison is computed trivially.
6.2 Comparison Between Pointers and -1
Several system calls, such as mmap or sbrk, are expected to return pointers but
return -1 on error. When a function calls mmap for example, there is typically a
check that the system call succeeded (i.e. the returned value is not -1).
void ∗p = mmap(...); if (p == −1) { ... }
Our normalisation gives a semantics to this programming pattern using the
following reasoning. We know that pointers returned by mmap are aligned on a
page boundary (212 in our implementation, i.e. the 11 last bits of the pointer
are zeros). When the allocation succeeds, the pointer can therefore never be -1
(in binary 0xFFFFFFFF) thus allowing to evaluate this comparison.
6.3 Operations on Undefined Values
The example shown is Fig. 1 is a simplified version of a C expression that ap-
pears in real-life programs. For example, the memalign function described above
features this kind of operations on undefined values.
The memory managed by the dynamic allocation functions is organised in
memory chunks, which consist of two 32-bit words of meta-data and the mem-
ory chunk itself. The second word of meta-data stores the size of the chunk
and two bits of other information. Initialising the meta-data is done with the C
code ∗p = (∗p & 0b1)|size|0b10 (the 0b prefix applies to constants in binary
format). When the memory pointed by p is undefined, this ends up with the sym-
bolic value (undef & 0b1)|size|0b10. It does not evaluate as a value, because
the last bit is still undefined.
However, our semantics enables us to keep a symbolic value holding infor-
mation about all the other bits instead of getting stuck. For instance, the sym-
bolic value ((undef & 0b1)|size|0b10) & 0b10 has the well-defined normalisa-
tion 0b10 and retrieves the second last bit of the meta-data. This reasoning is
made possible by the fact that size is a multiple of 4 (i.e. the last two trailing
bits of size are zeros).
6.4 Copying Bytes between Memory Areas with memmove
Our semantics requires the target of jump instructions to be unique. This is a
consequence of the fact that a symbolic value representing a conditional should
normalise to some fixed boolean value. In other words, a program whose control-
flow depends on the memory layout has an undefined behaviour. This depen-
dance on the memory layout (e.g. on the memory allocator) is a portability bug
that is detected by our semantics.
Indeed, in our experiments, we have encountered this situation for the memmove
function (see Fig. 5) which implements a memory copy even when the origin and
destination memory regions do overlap. To cope with this situation, the memmove
function performs the pointer comparison dest <= src. If the pointers dest and
src point to distinct memory blocks, this comparison depends on the memory
layout and is therefore undefined for our memory model.
void ∗ memmove( void ∗ s1, const void ∗ s2, size_t n ) {
char ∗ dest = (char ∗) s1;
const char ∗ src = (const char ∗) s2;
if ( dest <= src )
while ( n−− ) { ∗dest++ = ∗src++; }
else {
src += n; dest += n;
while ( n−− ) { ∗−−dest = ∗−−src; }
}
return s1;
}
Fig. 5. memmove with an undefined semantics
We have solved the issue by replacing the original condition dest <= src
with the more involved condition src <= dest & dest < src + n. This condi-
tion explicitly tests whether the memory regions overlap using the integer n
which is the number of bytes to be copied. Notice that we use on purpose the
bitwise & operator (and not the lazy boolean && operator). A && would force the
evaluation of src <= dest which cannot be normalised. The new condition with
a & constructs a symbolic value which is independent from the memory layout
and has therfore always a defined normalisation. In particular, if the pointers are
from distinct blocks, the condition is always false because locations from distinct
blocks cannot overlap.
7 Related Work
Wang et al. have shown that undefined behaviours of the ISO C standard have a
negative impact on the security of software [19]. To tackle the problem Wang et
al. propose a compiler-based approach to identify pieces of code whose optimised
generated code exploit undefined behaviours [20]. We adopt a semantics-based
approach that aims at giving a meaning to programs that do not have a defined
behaviour according to the ISO C standard.
Memory models have been proposed to ease the reasoning about low-level
code. The VCC system [4] generates verification conditions using an abstract
typed memory model [5] where the memory is a mapping from typed pointers
(p ∈ T × B|u64|) to structured C values. This memory model is not formally
verified. Using the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant, the Autocorres tool [8,9] con-
structs provably correct abstractions of C programs. Following Tuch et al. [18],
a concrete memory is abstracted by an abstract memory m ∈ ′a ptr → ′a option
where ′a represents the type of the pointer. The memory models of VCC [5] and
Autocorres [9] ensure separation properties of pointers for high-level code and are
complete with respet to the concrete memory model. For the CompCert mem-
ory model [15], separation properties of pointers are for free because pointers are
modelled as abstract locations l ∈ block×offset . For our symbolic extension, the
completeness (and correctness) of the normalisation is defined with respect to a
concrete memory model and therefore allows to reason about low-level idioms.
Several formal semantics of C are defined over a block based memory model
where pointers are modelled by a location l ∈ block ×offset [7,12,14]. The differ-
ent models differ upon their precise interpretation of the ISO C standard. The
CompCert C semantics [3] provides the specification for the correctness of the
CompCert compiler [14]. CompCert is used to compile safety critical embedded
systems [1] and the semantics departs from the ISO C standard to capture ex-
isting practices. Our semantics extends the existing CompCert semantics and
benefits from its infrastructure.
Krebbers also extends the CompCert semantics but aims at being as close
as possible to the C standard and proposes a formalisation of sequence points in
non-deterministic programs [12] and of strict aliasing restrictions in union types
of C11 [11]. These aspects are orthogonal to the focus of our semantics which
gives a meaning to implementation defined low-level pointer arithmetic. Ellison
and Ros¸u [7] propose an executable C semantics using the K framework [16].
Unlike our semantics with symbolic values, they do not model low-level pointer
arithmetic and only have a partial symbolic support for uninitialised values [7,
Section 6.2.2].
8 Conclusion
We propose an executable semantics for C programs that augments the block
based memory model of CompCert with the ability to reason about low-level
pointer arithmetic and uninitialised values. The key insight is the use of symbolic
values that represent delayed computations: symbolic values are only normalised
when a concrete value is really needed. The normalisation is executable and
efficient in practice thanks to the use of SMT solvers.
As future work, we shall investigate how to adapt the correctness proof of the
CompCert compiler to our new memory model. A difficulty is that our model
makes explicit that the memory is finite as the normalisation exploits the fact
that pointers are indistinguishable from C integers. Moreover, our memory model
is general enough and should be helpful to add in CompCert new target archi-
tectures where integer and float values are not so clearly separated in memory
or in registers (e.g. SIMD architecture).
As another line of research, we intend to study how to ground security anal-
yses upon our enhanced memory model. A feature of our memory model is that
the normalisation, seen as an SMT query, implicitly enumerates all the possible
concrete memory configurations. We shall investigate how to augment the ax-
iomatisation of the memory to assess the consequences of a memory violation
(e.g. use-after-free), and perform detailed vulnerability analyses.
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